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AN ECOLOGICAL THEORY OF STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 
NICHOLAS S. BRYNER* 
ABSTRACT 
Canons of construction serve as a set of ground rules that judges rely on in 
interpreting statutes. Substantive canons of construction, in particular, are princi-
ples and presumptions that point judges in a specific policy direction in order to serve 
underlying public values. Many of these substantive canons share a common justifi-
cation: judges have developed them to mitigate threats of irreversible harm to vul-
nerable and underrepresented interests and to incentivize clarity in the legislative 
process. This Article argues that environmental interests—the interests of present 
and future generations in maintaining ecological conditions that support life—merit 
similar protection. Therefore, judges should employ an environmental canon of con-
struction: whenever possible, statutes must be read in a manner that best promotes 
ecological integrity and sustainability for present and future generations. 
The Article examines several common substantive canons and concludes that 
environmental interests and values justify a similar canon. An environmental canon 
of construction also finds support in the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 
which provides that “the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States 
shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with” the environmental poli-
cies listed in the statute. Recognizing a substantive environmental canon would 
place ecological concerns on the same level, legally and rhetorically, with other fun-
damental rights and concerns—granting legitimacy to the consideration of environ-
mental impacts in judicial reasoning and bringing our legal system in line with sci-
entific understanding of our role and responsibility in an ecologically interdependent 
world. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Common theories of statutory interpretation cast the connection between 
legislative and judicial authorities as analogous to a principal-agent relationship.1 At 
the federal level, the principal-agent framework focuses on the primacy of Con-
gress’s constitutional authority to legislate—to make law.2 Courts serve as “agents” 
of the legislative branch, tasked with interpreting the language of the statute and 
giving it meaning that can be applied to a particular case or controversy.3 
Textualism, intentionalism, and pragmatism all represent different ways of 
thinking about how courts best fulfill their duty as agents of Congress.4 These 
schools of thought in statutory interpretation diverge on the question of which 
sources are valid or helpful in ascertaining what Congress has established as law. 
For textualists and purposivists alike, the starting point in reading a statute is, of 
course, reading the statute.5 While textualists argue that the text is the law,6 others 
may define the law as the legislature’s intent; that is, the law is reflected in the 
words of the statute, but is not simply the set of words of the statute itself.7 
                                                                
 1. See, e.g., FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 3 (2009); Cass 
R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 415 (1989) (discussing the 
theory of courts as agents as “the most prominent conception of the role of courts in statutory construc-
tion,” while highlighting the limitations and weaknesses of this approach). 
 2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 3. While the principal-agent analogy is imperfect, it has been influential because it seems con-
sistent with the narrative of judicial restraint and the judiciary as the “weakest” and “least dangerous” 
branch of government. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton); see also, e.g., Guido Calabresi, Being 
Honest about Being Honest Agents, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 907, 907 (2010) (agreeing that “judges should 
be the honest agents of the enacting legislature” while expressing different views about how judges best 
accomplish this); Frank H. Easterbrook, Judges as Honest Agents, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 915, 915 (2010) 
(“[F]aithful application of statutes is part of our heritage from the United Kingdom, and thus what the phrase 
‘the judicial Power’ in Article III means.”).  
 4. See generally CROSS, supra note 1. 
 5. See, e.g., id. at 56–57. 
 6. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 22 (2012). 
 7. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Siegel, Symmetries—And Asymmetries—Between Theories of Statutory 
Interpretation, 99 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 182, 186 (2014). 
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Regardless of the approach, statutory construction is about more than simply 
looking up the dictionary definitions to the words that Congress has written down 
on pages and sent off for the president’s signature. All theories and notions of stat-
utory construction rely, to at least some degree, on some extratextual baseline, or 
rather, a set of principles and hermeneutics for arriving at the meaning of words, 
series of words, and phrases in a statute.8 Many of these ground rules are expressed 
as judicial canons of construction, which offer a collection of flexible tools for un-
derstanding legislative language. 
The literature on canons describes various types: linguistic, referential, and 
substantive.9 Linguistic canons provide general grammatical or syntactic rules for 
reading the language of a statute,10 while referential canons “refer[] the Court to 
an outside or preexisting source to determine statutory meaning.”11 
Substantive canons, on the other hand, create presumptions that point judges 
in a particular policy direction, based on the statute’s subject matter or the interests 
that the statute affects.12 Eskridge and Frickey distinguish substantive canons from 
the others: although competing substantive canons exist and may push and pull in 
different directions, the substantive canons as a whole “are not policy neutral” and 
“represent value choices by the Court.”13 
Many of the most frequently used substantive canons share a common justi-
fication: judges have developed them to mitigate threats of irreversible harm to 
vulnerable and underrepresented interests and to incentivize clarity in the legisla-
tive process.14 They exist to serve underlying public values that may be threatened 
by a less-than-careful interpretation of the law. For example, in criminal law, the 
rule of lenity, as a substantive canon of construction, requires that ambiguities in 
                                                                
 8. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 1, at 411 (“The meaning of a statute inevitably depends on the 
precepts with which interpreters approach its text. Statutes do not have pre-interpretive meanings, and the 
process of interpretation requires courts to draw on background principles.”). 
 9. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear State-
ment Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 595 (1992). 
 10. Id. Some examples of linguistic canons include the rule that the expression of one thing is the 
exclusion of another, as well as the rule that words, especially those in a series, are defined and contextu-
alized by their neighbors (noscitur a sociis). 
 11. Id. Karl Llewellyn’s famous article listed many of these two types of canons, arguing that 
competing counter-canons make their application unreliable. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory 
of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Cannons about How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 
(1950). 
 12. See, e.g., Anita S. Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 825 
(2017); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 9, at 595 (suggesting that substantive canons are rooted in “substan-
tive values drawn from the common law, federal statutes, or the United States Constitution”). 
 13. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 9, at 595–96. Krishnakumar divides substantive canons ac-
cording to strength of the canon (i.e. the level of clarity required to preclude the canon’s application). Her 
three categories include “presumptions,” “‘liberal’ or ‘strict’ construction canons,” and “clear statement 
rules.” Krishnakumar, supra note 12, at 835. 
 14. The best-known substantive canons that reflect these goals include, for example, the rule of 
lenity (criminal statutes are interpreted in a manner that favors the defendant), the rule of liberal or broad 
construction of statutes with a “remedial purpose,” the rule of constitutional avoidance (operating, in part, 
as a buffer for constitutionally-protected interests), and the “Indian canons of construction” in U.S.-Native 
American law. See infra Part II. Common substantive canons of construction address structural questions 
with regard to federalism or the separation of powers, such as the canon requiring a clear statement to 
waive sovereign immunity or the presumption of the availability of judicial review.  
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criminal statutes be construed in favor of defendants.15 The rule protects against 
due process concerns, safeguarding criminal defendants from irreversible harm, by 
requiring a clear statement that the conduct in question is proscribed before a law 
will be applied to deprive them of their rights and liberties.  
This Article argues that environmental interests—the interests of both pre-
sent and future generations in maintaining ecological conditions that support life—
merit similar protection. Human activity in today’s world—urban development, ag-
riculture, industrial activity and pollution, large-scale landscape modifications, and 
the release of atmosphere-changing greenhouse gases—has reached a scale that 
exposes the sensitivity and vulnerability of our environment.16 Although environ-
mental science indicates that ecosystems are dynamic, rather than stable, pressure 
from human activity can affect the resilience of those ecosystems and lead to dras-
tic change.17 Every action we take at a nationwide scale impacts our surrounding 
environment, and many human-driven ecological crises—climate change, biodiver-
sity loss, and air and water pollution—have the potential to create significant and 
irreversible harm to present and future generations. 
Environmental crises pose a great risk for the well-being of our society; at the 
same time, market and government failures show how environmental interests re-
main vulnerable and underrepresented in the operations of the usual political pro-
cess. Just as judges rely on substantive canons of construction to mitigate threats 
of irreversible harm in criminal law, U.S.-Native American law, and other areas, 
judges should employ an environmental canon of construction: when possible, stat-
utes must be read in a manner that best promotes ecological integrity and sustain-
ability for present and future generations. Only a clear statement in a statute may 
overcome this rule. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II begins with a discussion of statutory 
interpretation theory and several key substantive canons of construction.18 Part II 
also examines the justification for various statutory interpretation presumptions 
that favor vulnerable or underrepresented interests, making the case that environ-
mental interests should be treated with the same regard by applying an environ-
mental canon of construction.19 Part III provides additional justification for an envi-
ronmental canon of construction by looking to the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA).20 NEPA is most widely known for its requirement that federal agencies 
assess environmental impacts (and consider alternatives) before engaging in major 
                                                                
  15. See infra Section II.A.  
 16. See, e.g., Sean L. Maxwell et. al., Biodiversity: The Ravages of Guns, Nets and Bulldozers, 536 
NATURE 143 (2016) (analyzing the most significant threats to endangered species worldwide, including over-
exploitation, agricultural activity, urban development, invasion and disease, pollution, system modification, 
and climate change).  
 17. See, e.g., C.S. Holling, Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems, 4 ANN. REV. ECOLOGY & 
SYSTEMATICS 1, 7 (1973) (“[N]atural systems have a high capacity to absorb change without dramatically al-
tering. But this resilient character has its limits, and when the limits are passed . . . the system rapidly 
changes to another condition”). 
  18. See infra Part II. 
  19. See infra Part II. 
 20. See infra Part III; National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2012). 
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actions.21 Yet NEPA calls for more than environmental impact assessment: the stat-
ute also includes a specific charge that “the policies, regulations, and public laws of 
the United States . . . be interpreted and administered . . .” in accordance with the 
environmental policies defined in that Act.22 Although courts have never explored 
in depth the reach or the consequences of this provision in NEPA for judicial inter-
pretation of federal statutes, it serves as a clear statutory mandate in support of an 
environmental canon of construction. Part IV acknowledges that an environmental 
canon of construction would represent a shift in American jurisprudence.23 Other, 
similar shifts—changing doctrines of standing in U.S. law and examples in compar-
ative law of judicial use of environmental principles on statutory interpretation—
provide useful lessons for how this transition can work. Part V explores how the 
environmental canon of construction could operate in practice, using as examples 
some recent cases where it may have had an impact in statutory construction.24 Part 
VI addresses some potential counterarguments and issues for further exploration, 
followed by a brief conclusion.25 
Applying an environmental canon of construction in U.S. law would be a trans-
formational change from a doctrinal standpoint, though the practical impacts would 
likely be incremental, rather than radical. In most statutory interpretation cases, 
the rule would probably not affect the outcome. As with other canons, a clear coun-
ter-environmental statement in the plain language of the statute would overcome 
the rule’s application.26 Further, those who criticize the notion of canons, arguing 
that judges use them only as post hoc justifications for decisions, rather than as 
inputs to judicial decision-making, would not expect a new canon to have any on-
the-ground impact.27 
Notwithstanding these limitations, developing and employing an environmen-
tal canon of construction would bring benefits in three significant ways. The first is 
substantive: to the extent that the canon influences judicial decisions, it will lead to 
a readjustment of values in the legal system, promoting more equitable outcomes 
for people affected by pollution and more environmentally sustainable outcomes 
that protect future generations’ interests. Second, as a procedural matter, the 
canon of construction requires Congress to act deliberately on environmental is-
sues—clear statements are required for statutes that will negatively impact the en-
vironment and all of us that depend on it.  
Finally, the canon can have an impact through the message conveyed simply 
by its recognition. This is because the content of substantive canons helps signal 
which types of interests and concerns that we as a society should expect judges to 
consider when statutes may be open to multiple interpretations.  Recognition of a 
                                                                
  21. NEPA § 102(1), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(1). 
 22. Id.  
  23. See infra Part IV.  
  24. See infra Part V. 
  25. See infra Part VI. 
 26. See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 9 (discussing “clear statement” rules). 
 27. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan, Precedent in Statutory Interpretation, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1165 
(2016); see infra Part II. 
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canon of construction places it within the appropriate bounds for making conclu-
sions as to statutory meaning,28 even if the existence of competing canons and com-
peting principles means that no one canon will guarantee a precise outcome in a 
particular case.29 Articulating a substantive environmental canon places ecological 
concerns on the same level, legally and rhetorically, with other fundamental rights 
and concerns. Doing so grants legitimacy to the consideration of the environment 
in judicial decision-making—an important reform to bring our legal system in line 
with scientific understanding of our role and responsibility in an ecologically inter-
dependent world. 
II. SUBSTANTIVE CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION AND ENVIRONMENTAL INTERESTS 
Canons of construction are, generally speaking, the ground rules for judges in 
interpreting statutes. Eskridge described them as the “lingua franca of statutory 
interpretation.”30 Substantive canons, within this lingua franca, are principles de-
signed by judges “to protect important background norms derived from the Consti-
tution, common-law practices, or policies related to particular subject areas.”31 
Some of the substantive canons protect institutional concerns, maintaining rela-
tionships of federalism, and monitoring the separation of powers among govern-
ment branches.32 Yet judges have formulated a set of these substantive canons of 
construction in order to tip the scales of justice, at times, to protect important, vul-
nerable interests. 
Critics of the canons see them as meaningless, at best, and perhaps nefarious; 
because canons can frequently be found to support either side of a dispute over 
interpretation, judges may simply choose whichever ones best suit their prior as-
sumptions or policy preferences with regard to the case.33 According to this line of 
thinking, canons are unhelpful because they fail to provide predictable consistency 
in how judges will interpret statutory language.34 
                                                                
 28. See, e.g., Solan, supra note 27, at 1186 (“[J]udges continue to cite these canons, not as the 
starting point for justifying their application in a particular case, but rather for the purpose of suggesting 
that they are sufficiently authoritative because they were used in earlier cases.”). 
 29. Solan argues that substantive canons “are notoriously elastic and are applied so unevenly as 
to appear more as background values than as precise interpretive principles[,]” but notes that “courts take 
them seriously, and they appear to influence the outcome of cases.” Id. at 1187. In a recent empirical study, 
Anita Krishnakumar finds that Supreme Court Justices “duel[] over most textualist-preferred interpretive 
tools [at] roughly the same [rate as] . . . over purposivist-preferred interpretive tools[,]” suggesting that 
linguistic canons do not have any greater effect in ensuring consistent or predictable interpretations than 
tools such as legislative history or reference to congressional intent or purpose. Anita S. Krishnakumar, Du-
eling Canons, 65 DUKE L.J. 909, 914 (2016). All of this is to say that, with some frequency, judges do regularly 
employ canons of construction and seem to view them as legitimate bases for judicial reasoning in statutory 
interpretation cases, even if, in theory and in practice, they do not effectively constrain judges’ interpreta-
tions in a consistent way.  
 30. William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial Power” in 
Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 1100 (2001) (emphasis added). 
 31. Krishnakumar, supra note 12, at 833. 
 32.  Id. at 897–99.  
 33. See Llewellyn, supra note 11, at 401–06 (listing the “thrust” and “parry” of opposing canons). 
 34. Some recent scholarship has criticized substantive canons for playing too large a role in stat-
utory interpretation and has suggested that judges assert fidelity to textualism while importing their policy 
 
2018 AN ECOLOGICAL THEORY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 9 
 
Skepticism as to whether canons of construction actually “bind” judges or 
cause them to reach results contrary to their general disposition or values does not 
make the canons meaningless. As Eskridge and Frickey have argued, canons may be 
important as outputs, even in cases where they do not appear to have been signifi-
cant inputs in influencing a judicial decision: “canons are one means by which the 
Court expresses the value choices that it is making or strategies it is taking when it 
interprets statutes.”35 Some measure of judicial choice or value judgment is neces-
sarily a part of statutory interpretation, whether done in a textualist framework or 
otherwise.36 Thus, canons can be meaningful as a way of organizing and legitimizing 
the discourse, and of laying out the factors and considerations that judges take into 
account in going about their task.37 Context, to some degree, dictates the weight 
given to each of those factors and considerations.38 
Below are several substantive canons and presumptions that cut across differ-
ent areas of law, with a brief examination of the source and justification for these 
canons. Environmental interests are analogous to many of the values—common 
law, statutory, and constitutional—underlying these canons. If such canons and 
rules are justified, then judges should also apply a robust environmental canon of 
construction. 
A. Rule of Lenity 
In criminal law, the rule of lenity originated as a common law principle: “penal 
statutes should be strictly construed against the government or parties seeking to 
enforce statutory penalties and in favor of the persons on whom penalties are 
sought to be imposed.”39 Judges and commentators have justified this rule based 
on two main reasons: first, notice and due process concerns; and second, separa-
tion of powers.40 
                                                                
preferences through the use of substantive canons. See, e.g., Krishnakumar, supra note 12, at 835–39 (not-
ing, while disagreeing with, this argument as the “prevailing wisdom” on substantive canons). Krishnakumar 
finds in an empirical study of Supreme Court decisions that the Roberts Court relied on substantive canons 
in 14.4% of a set of 603 statutory cases from 2005 to 2011. Id. at 850. This rate is lower than for other 
interpretive tools, but still represents a significant number of cases. Id. at 850–855. 
 35. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 9, at 596. 
 36. E.g., Siegel, supra note 7, at 184. 
 37. On the subject of the rule of lenity, Lawrence Solan argued that although it is “unrealistic” to 
expect consistency from rules of statutory interpretation,  
[w]e can try to set a framework . . . to structure disputes so that disagreements focus on the 
issues upon which disagreement exists. In that way, even when we do not like the result of a 
particular case, we can at least say that the Court gave serious consideration to the significant 
issues. 
Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57, 144 (1998). 
 38.  See id.  
 39. Id. at 58 (quoting 2B NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 59.03 (5th ed. 
1992)). 
 40. See, e.g., Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985) (“Application of the rule of lenity 
ensures that criminal statutes will provide fair warning concerning conduct rendered illegal and strikes the 
appropriate balance between the legislature, the prosecutor, and the court in defining criminal liability.”). 
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Lenity serves due process interests by requiring that criminal statutes provide 
sufficiently clear notice of what specific conduct is prohibited.41 Another justifica-
tion for the rule is that it furthers separation of powers, on the premise that the 
role of defining criminal conduct should rest with the legislative branch and should 
not be enlarged by the judiciary or left too much to prosecutorial discretion.  
The underlying social value that the rule supports is the protection of accused 
persons from the risk of serious or irreversible harm to their liberty in the case of 
misinterpretation.42 The rule of lenity is thus motivated by “[a] combination of 
deeply held values and the frailties of the human condition.”43 A brief exploration 
of how the rule of lenity has been applied sheds light on how it fulfills this value and 
provides examples of how the recognition of a substantive canon of construction 
impacts judges’ articulated decision-making process in judicial opinions interpreting 
statutes. 
In seventeenth-century England, judges developed the rule as a means of 
thwarting harsh penal statutes, most of which called for capital punishment.44 
Judges would employ linguistic ambiguities as a means to temper the applicability 
of these laws, even when other readings would be more consistent with what, in all 
likelihood, was the intent of the statute.45 
In the United States, and especially in the modern era, the rule has been ap-
plied more narrowly.  Chief Justice John Marshall wrote that the rule was based 
both “on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals; and on the plain 
principle that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial 
department.”46 Per Marshall, “though penal laws are to be construed strictly, they 
are not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the legisla-
ture.”47 Therefore, the rule had shifted from being a vehicle to frustrate (unduly 
harsh) legislative purposes to one that was limited to applications where the legis-
lature’s intention was unclear. The rule is instead couched as deference to the leg-
islature, with a preference for under applying the law rather than extending it—but 
with the purpose of erring on the side of preserving individual rights.  In other 
words, given the importance of the right to liberty as a value in our legal system, 
courts decline to apply criminal statutes unless the legislature has made it clear that 
the conduct is to be prohibited and punished.  
                                                                
 41. See McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) (“Although it is not likely that a criminal 
will carefully consider the text of the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning 
should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends 
to do if a certain line is passed.”) (quoted in Solan, supra note 37, at 134). 
 42. See, e.g., Shon Hopwood, Clarity in Criminal Law, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 695, 701 (2017). In an 
era of criminal law codified in statute, distinct from the legal system of common-law crimes in which the 
rule of lenity originated, the rule must balance these goals with deference to the legislative branch. See 
Solan, supra note 37, at 59. 
 43. Solan, supra note 37, at 143. 
 44. See id. at 87. 
 45. See id. at 87–88 (describing examples of courts holding that a statute prohibiting “‘stealing 
horses’” did not apply to a person who stole a single horse and that another criminalizing “‘stealing sheep 
or other cattle’” was too ambiguous to be applied to any animal other than sheep themselves). 
 46. United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95 (1820). 
 47. Id. The question before the Court in the case was whether a statute that criminalized man-
slaughter on the “high seas” should be extended, by implication, to apply to conduct on a river in foreign 
territory. Id. at 87. 
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By the 1950s, the Supreme Court described the rule of lenity as thus: although 
criminal statutes should generally be given “commonsensical meaning . . . when 
choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made 
a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that 
Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite.”48 
As Solan has argued, a less-frequent application of the rule of lenity made 
sense in the jurisprudence that had developed by the mid-twentieth century.49 Ex-
panded use of legislative history and other contextual tools of statutory construc-
tion provided additional opportunities for courts to ascertain a clear meaning of the 
statute, making a determination that a statute is truly ambiguous and the actual 
application of the rule relatively rare.50 
These shifts in statutory interpretation have perhaps relegated the rule of len-
ity to a less prominent status, as a tiebreaker when other rules fail to resolve the 
question. In some cases, judges decide on a lenient interpretation on other grounds, 
simply noting that the rule of lenity also supports that position.51 However, courts 
continue to demonstrate the importance of the rule by citing it even when they 
decline to apply it. In a 2016 case before the Supreme Court, Lockhart v. United 
States, Justice Sotomayor wrote that “[w]e have used the lenity principle to resolve 
ambiguity in favor of the defendant only ‘at the end of the process of construing 
what Congress has expressed’ when the ordinary canons of statutory construction 
have revealed no satisfactory construction.”52 
Lockhart involved the application of mandatory minimum and increased max-
imum sentences for persons with certain prior convictions in the statute criminaliz-
ing possession of child pornography.53 The six-Justice majority noted that two can-
ons—the “last antecedent” rule and the “series-qualifier principle”— would point 
to opposing interpretations of the statute in question, but declined to apply the 
canon that would reach the more lenient result, holding instead that only the last 
antecedent rule was “well supported by context.”54 Justice Kagan, on the other 
                                                                
 48. United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221–22 (1952). For additional ex-
amples and explanation of the rule, see Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 9, at 600–01. 
 49. Several states also enacted legislation to abolish the rule; however, this has served to mini-
mize it, rather than eliminate it entirely, as courts in California and New York, for example, have continued 
to use a form of it on the grounds of fairness and notice. See Solan, supra note 37, at 122–28. 
 50. See id. at 97–108. 
 51. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015) (overturning a conviction under the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act for the destruction of fish that were evidence of a violation of federal fishing laws); see 
also infra Section V.C. 
 52. Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958, 968 (2016) (quoting Callanan v. United States, 364 
U.S. 587, 596 (1961)). In another case, later in 2016, involving a bank fraud statute, the Supreme Court 
restated its recent jurisprudence, quoting from Callanan as well: “the rule [of lenity] applies if ‘at the end of 
the process of construing what Congress has expressed,’ there is ‘a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the 
statute.’” Shaw v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 462, 469 (2016) (citations omitted) (quoting Callanan, 364 U.S. 
at 596; Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138–39 (1998)). In Shaw, the Supreme Court held that a 
statute prohibiting “defraud[ing] a financial institution” could be applied against a defendant, even where 
it could only be shown that he had the specific intent to steal money deposited in a bank yet held by an 
individual, rather than intent to deceive the bank itself. Shaw, 137 S. Ct. at 468–69. 
 53. Lockhart, 136 S. Ct. at 961. 
 54. Id. at 968. 
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hand, argued in her dissent that the series-qualifier canon was supported by legis-
lative history, but noted also that “if any doubt remained, the rule of lenity would 
command the same result.”55 
The dialogue among Supreme Court Justices in recent cases such as Lockhart 
shows that the rule of lenity still remains as a legitimate authority for judges to turn 
to in interpreting ambiguous statutes. Both sides in such disputes find it necessary 
to address the rule in crafting their arguments. Inconsistency due to the lack of a 
definitive theory as to when a statute becomes sufficiently ambiguous for the ap-
plication of the rule of lenity (or many other substantive canons of construction) 
can make the rule seem flexible.56 However, even if the rule cannot provide an er-
ror-proof method for predicting the outcome of a particular case in advance, that 
would not mean it fails to serve important interests.57 
The “tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals[,]”58 as John Marshall 
put it, suggests why the rule maintains some currency. Criminal law pits an individ-
ual’s liberty against the interests of the State. Because an errant interpretation may 
lead to irreversible harm to that liberty, the mere recognition of the rule of lenity 
encourages judges to wrestle with that balancing of interests in a way that might 
not otherwise occur; judges can rely on the rule in considering the equities of each 
competing reading of an ambiguous statute. 
B. U.S.-Native American Law: Indian Canons of Construction 
A second example of substantive canons of construction in the United States 
that tip the scales toward vulnerable or underrepresented interests is the set of so-
called “Indian canons of construction” in law regarding Native American tribes. 
These canons require that “treaties, agreements, statutes, and executive orders be 
liberally construed in favor of the Indians and that all ambiguities are to be resolved 
in their favor.”59 Further, treaties are to be read “in the sense in which they would 
naturally be understood by the Indians.”60 Federal statutes, dating to an 1834 Act 
of Congress, incorporate the same rule in property disputes: in trials between a Na-
tive American and a white person, “the burden of proof shall rest upon the white 
                                                                
 55. Id. at 969 (Kagan, J., dissenting). The focus by both the majority and dissent on the wording 
of the statute, despite general agreement that it was not well drafted, belies the importance of textualism 
to the Court in recent years. See David A. Strauss, The Plain Language Court, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 651, 663–
64 (2016). No one would really suggest that Congress, in drafting the statute at issue in Lockhart, was con-
sidering the finer points of whether the “last antecedent” or “series-qualifier” canons would be applied 
when courts interpreted it. As Strauss puts it, “it is very likely that the words were not written with that case 
in mind; if they had been written with that case in mind, the authors would have made the answer clear.” 
Id. at 669. In other words, the Court is accomplishing something other than deference to legislative intent 
with this line of arguments; however, the canons provided common ground on which the differing sides 
could rely in outlining their reasoning.  
 56. See Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 890 
(2004). 
  57. See id. at 890–91. 
 58. United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95 (1820). 
 59. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 2.02[1] (Nell Jessup Newton ed., LexisNexis 2012); 
see also Cty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985). 
 60. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 676 
(1979) (quoting Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899)). 
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person, whenever the Indian shall make out a presumption of title in himself from 
the fact of previous possession or ownership.”61 
The history of U.S. judicial decisions with regard to Native American peoples 
is replete with examples of grave injustice, both as European-descended settlers 
moved west, and later as the federal government pursued cycles of cultural assim-
ilation policies.62 However, U.S. courts adopted rules of statutory construction that, 
at least in cases where courts saw ambiguity, cut against the broader pattern of 
dispossession, in favor of Native American interests.63 These rules are consistent 
with a theory of substantive canons of construction rooted in public values of fair-
ness and the protection of minorities and vulnerable interests. 
Early U.S.-Native American law jurisprudence described the relationship be-
tween the United States and Native American tribes in paternalistic terms, as a trust 
relationship, with tribes as “domestic dependent nations . . . in a state of pupilage” 
and the federal government as a “guardian.”64 Notwithstanding the limits this legal 
view placed on the autonomy of the tribes, it did provide “an aspirational aura over 
federal Indian law” that gave at least one justification for pro-Indian canons of con-
struction.65 
In the seminal case, Worcester v. Georgia, Chief Justice Marshall described the 
Cherokee Nation as “a distinct community” but a “weak state,” placed “under the 
protection of one more powerful.”66 Language in the 1791 Cherokee treaty at issue 
in the case conceded to the U.S. Congress “the sole and exclusive right of regulating 
the trade with the Indians, and managing all their affairs, as they think proper.”67 
Although the Court could perhaps have read the italicized phrase to include political 
management, which would undercut Cherokee sovereignty, Marshall interpreted 
this as referring only to subjects connected with trade.68 To go any further, the 
Court reasoned, could not conceivably have been within the tribe’s intent and un-
derstanding of the agreement represented by the treaty.69 Frickey described the 
case as “[beginning] the notion that treaties are to be interpreted as the Indians 
would have understood them.”70 
                                                                
 61. 25 U.S.C. § 194 (2012). For an example of a case involving this provision, see Wilson v. Omaha 
Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653 (1979) (reaffirming the standard of shifting of the burden of proof, pursuant to 
25 U.S.C. § 194, but remanding the case on other grounds for resolution in state courts).   
 62. See generally Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823) (recognizing only a “right of occu-
pancy” by Native Americans to their lands and legalizing the extinguishment of Indian title by conquest or 
purchase). For more on Johnson and other cases, see WALTER R. ECHO-HAWK, IN THE COURTS OF THE CONQUEROR: 
THE 10 WORST INDIAN LAW CASES EVER DECIDED (2010). The most grievous legal injustices to Native Americans 
were, of course, not limited to court decisions, but also included legislation. See, e.g., The Dawes Act of 
1887, Pub. L. 49-119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (breaking up tribal ownership of lands). 
 63. David M. Blurton, Cannons of Construction, Stare Decisis and Dependent Indian Communities: 
A Test of Judicial Integrity, 16 ALASKA L. REV. 37, 39–40 (1999).  
 64. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831). 
 65. Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of Fed-
eral Indian Law, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1137, 1176–77 (1990). 
 66. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832). 
 67. Id. at 553 (emphasis in original). 
  68. Id. at 554.  
 69. Id. at 553–54. 
 70. Frickey, supra note 65, at 1177. 
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The preference for construing laws and policies related to Native Americans 
in their favor serves a goal of promoting clarity in actions among recognized sover-
eigns, as well as substantive concerns of fairness. In recognition of the fact that ne-
gotiations between Native Americans and the U.S. government took place in Eng-
lish, and on terms dictated mostly (if not entirely) by the United States, Marshall’s 
interpretation in Worcester reflected an understanding that this process indicated 
great inequity between the parties and the vast difference in their bargaining 
power.71 
Marshall also went further. In the decades that had passed between the Cher-
okee’s treaty and the time Worcester was decided, the United States had “op-
erat[ed] on the assumption that it had plenary power over tribes” and had, among 
other things, elected Andrew Jackson.72 However, Marshall maintained the im-
portance of the earlier treaty. As Frickey describes it, principles of interpretation 
required “measuring Indian interests from their strongest historical perspective, 
even if . . . in the contemporary circumstances they seem weaker.”73 “Essentially . . 
. Justice Marshall decided that it should not count against Indian interests that col-
onization was taking a toll.”74 
Given Marshall’s political position as a judge representing the institutions of 
the colonizers, a charitable reading of his jurisprudence—which had disastrous 
practical consequences for Native American rights—is that he was faced with the 
inevitable conclusion that he “could not entertain fundamental challenges to colo-
nization.”75 Instead, Marshall used rules of interpretation to displace the responsi-
bility for the destruction of tribal sovereignty toward Congress, which could ratify 
colonial prerogatives through a clearer expression of legislation.76 
There are significant theoretical parallels between the Indian canons of con-
struction and an envisioned environmental canon of construction. I do not mean to 
compare interpretations of environmental law with the tremendous, unspeakable 
human cost and injustice that Europeans have waged against the Americas’ original 
peoples over more than five centuries. The specific legal tool of the canon of con-
struction, though, is instructive in looking for analogies to environmental law prin-
ciples. Recognition of an interpretative rule favoring environmental concerns re-
mains within the existing anthropocentric and utilitarian order that prioritizes hu-
man interests over “nature.” As such, it does not guarantee environmentally opti-
mal or beneficial outcomes. Rather, it encourages judges to engage with the clash 
of values inherent in environmental and natural resources disputes, whether they 
implicate intra- or intergenerational equality or more “pure” ecological concerns. 
As the Marshall Court’s decisions forced Congress to take responsibility for its poli-
cies, an environmental canon places the responsibility for making decisions of last-
ing environmental consequences on the legislative branch, with greater delibera-
tion required, rather than allowing the legal system to continue to shore up anthro-
pocentric decisions under the guise of tradition and inertia. 
                                                                
  71. Id. at 1226.  
 72. Id. at 1227. 
  73. Id. at 1128. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See Frickey, supra note 65, at 1128. 
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An additional lesson is the suggestion that, despite the passing of time, courts 
can continue to regard vulnerable interests at their apex. This is tremendously con-
sequential in cases involving environmental degradation where, for example, the 
manner for setting the baseline condition of a parcel of land and its surroundings 
can determine what property owners can legally do or the extent to which govern-
ments can regulate uses without effectuating a compensable taking.77 Reasonable 
expectations regarding the use of property should, in this way, depend not only on 
the point in time in which environmental and ecosystem services on the land were 
at their lowest value (and in which property owners enjoyed the greatest discre-
tion), but also on consideration of the full value of those environmental interests,78 
free from and prior to human-caused degradation. 
In more recent times, reliance on the canons in Indian law has declined; during 
a prolonged period of the Rehnquist Court, from 1986-2001, Native American tribes 
lost seventy-seven percent of their cases before the Supreme Court.79 However, as 
with the rule of lenity, the continued recognition of the rule— even if it does not 
always prove determinative in a case—demonstrates a degree of judicial commit-
ment to the value of protecting underrepresented interests. When one side appeals 
to the canon, judges must wrestle with whether the law is sufficiently clear to work 
a result against those interests. 
C. Contra Proferentem in the Interpretation of Contracts 
In contract law, the contra proferentem rule provides that ambiguous provi-
sions should be construed against the contract’s drafter. As formulated in the Sec-
ond Restatement of Contracts: “In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a 
promise or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred which 
operates against the party who supplies the words or from whom a writing other-
wise proceeds.”80 
Although this rule has to do with the interpretation of contracts, rather than 
statutes, the rule is similar to the canons discussed above in two significant ways. 
First, the contra proferentem rule is supported by a policy choice to protect the in-
terests of parties with less bargaining power who were not given an adequate op-
portunity to shape the agreement.81 Second, an efficiency-based argument sup-
                                                                
 77. See, e.g., Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017); see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 
U.S. 1003 (1992). 
  78. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1070. 
 79. David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court’s Pursuit of States’ Rights, Color-
Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 280 (2001). Getches argued that these results in 
Indian law cases were explained by dominant trends toward states’ rights, away from protection of the 
rights of racial minorities, and toward protection of “mainstream values,” all of which led the Court to ignore 
or brush aside long-standing precedents and principles in Indian law. Id. at 268–69.  
 80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
 81. See DirecTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 475–76 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (refer-
ring to “the rule that ambiguous language should be construed against the drafter” and arguing that it 
should have been used in the case to favor satellite TV customers). 
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ports the rule as an incentive for clarity in articulating contracts—much as the can-
ons in criminal and Indian law look toward a clear statement by the legislative 
branch.82 
Environmental and natural resource laws are, in a sense, “contracts” that gov-
ern society’s interactions with the environment (i.e., what can be released into the 
environment, as well as what can be taken out of it). Laws that impact the environ-
ment also represent a “contract” between present generations and future genera-
tions that will depend on the same resources and ecosystem services.83 
Contract law also embraces the notion of default rules or background princi-
ples that kick in when an agreement is silent or when circumstances occur that the 
parties did not think to consider in their negotiation.84 The common law maxim in 
property law, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, provides that property should not 
be used so as to injure that of another.85 Borrowing from Aldo Leopold’s land ethic 
as well, the default normative rule is that one should not act in a way that tends to 
harm the ecological integrity of the environment.86 Taken together, these provide 
a default presumption in contracts between society and the environment that one 
may not take actions that create a negative external impact on the environment or 
that create a foreseeable negative impact on future generations. 
Earth’s ecosystems, of course, have no opportunity to shape or provide input 
to these sorts of actions, and neither do future generations, beyond what interests 
are represented by people today who are concerned about these impacts. There-
fore, the same values that promote the contra preferentem rule animate the idea 
that statutes permitting environmental impacts (even in the language of limiting or 
restricting environmental harms) should be read with caution; and where there is 
ambiguity, with a preference for interpretations that limit human impacts and pre-
serve ecological integrity and the interests of generations to come. 
D. Carolene Footnote Four Groups 
The famous fourth footnote from United States v. Carolene Products Co. (“Car-
olene Products”)87 stands for the proposition that judges should examine statutes 
differently if they affect “certain groups that cannot participate effectively in the 
                                                                
 82.Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §206 cmt. a (observing that the drafter of a contract is 
“more likely than the other party to have reason to know of uncertainties of meaning[,]” and therefore that 
the rule incentivizes the drafter to use clear terms). 
 83. See generally EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY (Richard Falk et al. eds., 1989) (on responsibilities to fu-
ture generations); MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR A NEW ECOLOGICAL AGE (Cam-
bridge Univ. Press, 2014) (on trust-like responsibilities more broadly with regard to the environment). 
  84. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of De-
fault Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989). 
 85. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387–88 (1926) (noting this principle and 
nuisance law in support of zoning restrictions). 
 86. See ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 201–26 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1968). 
 87. U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).  
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political process.”88 The reasoning behind that approach, which has significantly in-
fluenced thinking about judicial review, is that judges must play a role in preserving 
the due process and equal protection rights of “discrete and insular minorities.”89 
In the context of statutory interpretation, Eskridge and Frickey described how 
the Supreme Court has favored interpretations offering greater protection to Caro-
lene groups’ interests.90 This is done, in part, in connection with the canon of con-
stitutional avoidance: construing a statute in favor of a suspect classification averts 
the need to review its constitutional validity under a higher level of scrutiny.91 
Environmental interests and rights related to the environment are not “mi-
nority” interests in the sense of protected Carolene groups, although protected 
classes, such as racial minorities, do bear disproportionate environmental bur-
dens.92 However, the process-based justification—that such classifications are not 
adequately protected by the usual political process—translates quite well to mat-
ters of environmental protection and the enjoyment of human rights related to the 
environment. 
Environmental pollution is often cited as an example of market failure because 
the social costs associated with environmentally damaging activities are often 
shouldered by individuals, communities, and generations that do not share equita-
bly in the economic or social benefits from those activities.93 Negative environmen-
tal externalities, if left uncorrected, lead to inequitable and inefficient results for 
social welfare. Environmental harms, however, also result from “government fail-
ure” in multiple ways. Asymmetries between the diffuse, common benefits of eco-
system services (clean air, clean water, etc.) and concentrated economic benefits 
of environmentally damaging activities can distort legislative policy priorities and 
outcomes.94 Agency “capture” in environmental policymaking at the federal, state, 
or local level can also lead to socially undesirable outcomes.95 Political processes, 
for these reasons, may not adequately consider the environmental impacts of leg-
islation. 
A rule of liberal construction in favor of Carolene groups provides a buffer of 
protection for interests that the usual political process will not adequately safe-
                                                                
 88. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 1089 (1982). See also 
Felix Gilman, Famous Footnote Four: A History of the Carolene Products Footnote, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 163, 174 
(2004) (regarding the “political process model” of judicial review and the Carolene footnote). 
 89. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. 
 90. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 9, at 602–03 (describing the substantive canon of “[l]iberal 
[c]onstruction of [s]tatutes to [p]rotect Carolene [g]roups,” with examples of cases related to African Amer-
icans, Native Americans, noncitizens, etc.). 
 91. See id. 
 92. See generally LeRoy C. Paddock, Environmental Justice, in 2 DECISION MAKING IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW, ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 357 (LeRoy C. Paddock et al. eds., 2016). 
 93. See generally Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1495, 1503–08 (1999) (discussing market failures as a cause of environmental harms). 
 94. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 6, 28 
(1991) (discussing the insights of public choice theory for understanding the provision of environmental 
“public goods” and how laws can be distorted to benefit discrete economic groups at the expense of the 
public). 
 95. See generally Martin Lodge, Regulatory Capture Recaptured, 74 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 539, 539–
42 (2014). 
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guard. To the extent that the environment and future generations suffer from gov-
ernment failures, the same underlying value supports an environmental canon of 
construction. 
E. Broad Interpretation of Public Welfare Statutes and Statutes with a Remedial 
Purpose 
A further example that may guide judicial interpretation of environmental 
statutes is the general rule of liberal construction of laws intended to promote the 
public welfare or that have a “remedial purpose.”96 This canon bolsters claims for a 
strong purposivist interpretation of environmental statutes, particularly where 
their overall purpose is clearly tied to public health. Although courts have not widely 
relied on the remedial purpose canon in reading most major environmental stat-
utes—such as the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act—the canon does have a history 
of application to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA), which regulates hazardous waste.97 
Closely related to this canon on public welfare and remedial statutes is a doc-
trine that originated in English courts, known as the “equity of the statute.”98 Under 
this doctrine, judges look to the reasoning or purpose underlying a statute, and will 
apply its logic and terms to cases that do not fall within the statute’s express lan-
guage, but are within the statute’s purpose—consistent with the spirit of the law.99 
Although the doctrine is not commonly cited in modern U.S. courts, Llewellyn, in his 
“thrust and parry” list of canons, included the similar maxim that “[t]o effect its 
purpose a statute may be implemented beyond its text[]” as the counterweight to 
the charge that “[a] statute cannot go beyond its text.”100 
The significance of this canon is its suggestion that a statute’s public purpose 
can be a legitimate and appropriate source of authority for judges to rely on. When 
it comes to statutes traditionally considered part of “environmental law,” judicial 
employment of an environmental canon of construction would look, in practice, 
nearly identical to a strong purposivist reading based on the remedial purposes 
                                                                
 96. See Joel A. Mintz, Can You Reach New “Greens” if You Swing Old “Clubs”? Underutilized Prin-
ciples of Statutory Interpretation and their Potential Applicability in Environmental Cases, 7 ENVTL. L. 295, 
302–08 (2001). 
 97. See id. at 304 n.28 (citing a multitude of federal district court opinions employing the reme-
dial purpose canon in CERCLA cases); see also Blake A. Watson, Liberal Construction of CERCLA Under the 
Remedial Purpose Canon: Have the Lower Courts Taken a Good Thing Too Far?, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 199 
(1996). 
 98. See Mintz, supra note 96, at 308–14. But see John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of 
the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 (2001) (arguing that calls for the equity of the statute doctrine in the 
United States fail because of differences in the U.S. Constitution’s separation of powers and defined role of 
the judiciary within the overall governmental structure, as compared with English common law traditions). 
 99. See Mintz, supra note 96, at 308; Manning, supra note 98, at 22. Manning, as a critic of schol-
ars who have pushed for the use of the “equity of the statute” doctrine in the United States, characterizes 
the doctrine as a departure from the “faithful agent” theory of statutory interpretation. Id. Yet the doctrine’s 
focus on purpose suggests that it is not a rejection of the analogy of courts as agents of Congress; rather, it 
is a deep division in the scope of judicial prerogative in ascertaining and defining the will of Congress.  
 100. Llewellyn, supra note 11, at 401. 
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canon.101 Of course, the environmental canon of construction that has been de-
scribed above is broader. It applies beyond a specific set of statutes to any federal 
law with the potential to significantly affect environmental interests. 
F. Environmental Interests as Public Values 
The five examples above illustrate the ways in which certain common under-
lying public values with regard to the law influence statutory interpretation. The 
rule of lenity, Indian canons of construction, and recognition of Carolene groups all 
point toward a substantive preference—when interpreting ambiguous statutes—
toward interpretations that protect vulnerable or underrepresented interests. Con-
tract law’s interpretative rules suggest, by analogy, the same principle in safeguard-
ing vulnerable interests when construing legal instruments. Rules of broad con-
struction for statutes with a purpose of promoting public welfare or remedying 
harms to the public point toward the legitimacy of weighing public values in judicial 
decision-making. 
Environmental interests—speaking both of concern over threats to ecological 
integrity per se, as well as to anthropocentric rights and interests that depend on a 
healthy, functioning environment—deserve similar protection. Decisions and policy 
choices we make today may affect the wellbeing, rights, and opportunities of pre-
sent and future generations in ways that cannot be easily reversed.102 The precau-
tionary principle in environmental law and policy, recognized at the international 
level in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, reflects this 
concern.103 Twenty-five years after the Rio Declaration, however, environmental 
law in the United States remains stagnant. While our understanding of climate 
change, air pollution, species extinctions, and other environmental crises has 
changed, the core legal framework for addressing these concerns has not104—and 
continued environmental degradation highlights the degree to which the interests 
of current and future generations in an ecologically sustainable environment are 
vulnerable and underrepresented in the legislative process. 
An environmental canon of construction cannot, of course, address all of the 
legal system’s challenges in dealing with relationship between humans and the en-
vironment. But a canon of construction is justified because it will serve important 
public interests in a manner similar to other substantive canons. As shown further 
in the next section, environmental principles in interpreting statutes are, in fact, 
                                                                
 101. In these cases, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) bolsters the statute-specific re-
medial purpose canon by calling for interpretation of all statutes in a manner consistent with NEPA’s envi-
ronmental policies. See infra Part III. 
 102. See generally WEISS, supra note 83 (on responsibilities to future generations); WOOD, supra 
note 83 (on trust-like responsibilities more broadly with regard to the environment). 
 103. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and De-
velopment, princ. 15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), agenda 21 (June 1992) (“In order to protect the 
environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used 
as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”). 
 104. For example, the Clean Air Act was last amended in 1990, and the last major changes to the 
Clean Water Act were in 1987. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990); 
Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (1987).  
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what Congress has also compelled: a requirement that judges interpret the law in a 
manner that promotes environmental sustainability.105 
III. NEPA’S MANDATE FOR AN ENVIRONMENTAL CANON OF CONSTRUCTION 
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),106 signed by President Nixon in 
1970, transformed U.S. law by laying out a policy “to create and maintain conditions 
under which [humans] and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the 
social, economic, and other requirements of present and future generations of 
Americans.”107 NEPA has been a touchstone of environmental law in the United 
States for nearly fifty years. As one of the first major environmental statutes, it fun-
damentally altered federal decision-making. NEPA is best known for its provisions 
on environmental impact assessment. It requires “all agencies of the Federal Gov-
ernment” to study and disclose in an environmental impact statement (EIS) the im-
pacts (and alternatives) for all proposed “major Federal actions significantly affect-
ing the quality of the human environment . . . .”108 
Environmental impact assessment is a key element of an environmental pol-
icy; it requires government actors to consider environmental values in their deci-
sion-making process, alongside other objectives in designing and refining policy. 
NEPA’s requirement, along with the implementing regulations developed by the 
Council on Environmental Quality109 that flesh out how agencies conduct these as-
sessments, has served as a pattern for states and for many countries throughout 
the world.110 Courts have generally characterized NEPA’s environmental impact as-
sessment provision as a procedural requirement.111 It requires agencies to carry out 
the process thoroughly and in good faith to understand the expected environmen-
tal impacts of proposed projects and alternatives, but does not, courts have con-
cluded (or at least assumed), mandate a substantive level of environmental quality 
that must be met for a proposed activity to go forward.112 By 1989, the Supreme 
                                                                
 105. See infra Part III (analyzing Section 102(1) of the National Environmental Policy Act). 
 106. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2012)). 
 107. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2012). 
 108. § 4332(2)(C). 
 109. 40 C.F.R. pts. 1500–1508 (2018). 
 110. See U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, princ. 17, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), agenda 21 (June 1992) (calling on countries to 
undertake environmental impact assessment “for proposed activities that are likely to have a significant 
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Court stated that “it is now well settled that NEPA itself does not mandate particular 
results, but simply prescribes the necessary process[,]” and that “NEPA merely pro-
hibits uninformed—rather than unwise—agency action.”113 
Despite the importance of the EIS in environmental decision-making, much of 
NEPA’s promise remains unfulfilled.114 Earlier in the statute, NEPA provides not only 
a statement of principles that make up a national environmental policy, but also a 
far-reaching principle of interpretation.115 Section 102 of NEPA—the same section 
that gives rise to the EIS—begins with the following first clause and subsection: “The 
Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (1) the policies, 
regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and adminis-
tered in accordance with the policies set forth in this [Act.]”116 As Joel Mintz has 
noted, this provision, despite its clarity, has largely been ignored by both lawyers 
and judges.117 
The “policies” referred to in Section 102(1) are found in the previous section. 
Section 101 makes it 
 
the continuing policy of the Federal Government, in cooperation 
with State and local governments, and other concerned public and 
private organizations, to use all practicable means and measures, 
including financial and technical assistance, in a manner calculated 
to foster and promote the general welfare, to create and maintain 
conditions under which [humans] and nature can exist in productive 
harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements 
of present and future generations of Americans.118 
 
Subsections (b) and (c) give further instructions about how this policy is to be 
implemented: 
 
(b) In order to carry out the policy set forth in this chapter, it is the 
continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all prac-
ticable means, consistent with other essential considerations of na-
tional policy, to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, 
programs, and resources to the end that the Nation may- 
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the 
environment for succeeding generations; 
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(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and aes-
thetically and culturally pleasing surroundings; 
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment 
without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable 
and unintended consequences; 
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our 
national heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environ-
ment which supports diversity and variety of individual choice; 
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which 
will permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's 
amenities; and 
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the 
maximum attainable recycling of depletable resources. 
(c) The Congress recognizes that each person should enjoy a healthful 
environment and that each person has a responsibility to contribute 
to the preservation and enhancement of the environment.119 
 
Key legislators involved in drafting NEPA indicated that this lengthy list of pol-
icies was intended to transform federal policy by requiring “substantive attention” 
to be given to environmental matters.120 Notably, Section 101(c) includes language 
regarding a human right to a healthful environment, a right since guaranteed in the 
constitutions of several dozen countries, as well as several U.S. states.121 Even 
though NEPA does not list this or other concepts in terms of substantive rights, they 
are clearly stated as policy considerations that must be supported through “inter-
pret[ation] and administ[ration]” of “the policies, regulations, and public laws of the 
United States[.]”122 
Notwithstanding the text of Section 102(1) and its “interpretation” mandate, 
very few court decisions have applied this subsection. NEPA-related litigation and 
judicial decisions have instead been subsumed by implementation of the environ-
mental impact assessment requirement.123 In 2008, Mintz examined the judicial ap-
plication of the provision, noting that courts had only addressed it in six reported 
opinions—all from the 1970s—and none had directly analyzed the question of how 
NEPA should influence judicial statutory interpretation generally (as opposed to 
agency interpretations or implementation of NEPA).124 
One issue in understanding the effect of NEPA’s Section 102(1) is which 
branch(es) of government must follow the mandate to “interpret” laws, policies, 
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and regulations in accordance with environmental policies: does it apply to admin-
istrative agencies, courts, or both? Mintz’s review of the legislative history of NEPA 
provides no conclusive answer to this question. Most of the debate that exists in 
the public record was focused on the extent to which federal agencies would be 
forced to implement the Act.125 However, there is no textual indication that Section 
102(1) is limited only to agency interpretations. Section 102(2) specifically targets 
agencies, beginning with “all agencies of the Federal Government shall . . . .”126 Sec-
tion 102(1) contains no such language.127 Without it, the most natural way to read 
Section 102(1)’s charge that “the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United 
States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with” NEPA’s policies,128 
therefore, is that it “applies to all governmental entities in all branches of the fed-
eral government that are responsible for the interpretation as well as the admin-
istration of our nation’s policies, regulations, and public laws.”129 
In the six cases that grapple with this provision, courts have generally exam-
ined it only in the context of agency interpretation and implementation.130 These 
cases led to mixed results. In two cases, federal courts cited Section 102(1) in hold-
ing that certain activities of the Department of Transportation and the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers, respectively, were indeed subject to the NEPA environmental 
impact statement requirement.131 A third court quoted Section 102(1) in reference 
to the Secretary of the Interior’s interpretation of a federal statute (the Helium Act), 
noting then that if “the Secretary interpreted the objectives of the [statute] in an 
erroneous or unnecessarily restrictive manner, his action would be contrary to not 
only [that statute], but NEPA as well; the statutes themselves clearly provide ‘law 
to apply.’”132 Two other cases rejected litigants’ claims that Section 102(1) should 
be used to interpret other statutes together with NEPA—the Revenue Sharing Act 
and the statute that created the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency—in a way that 
would make environmental impact statements necessary for the agencies in-
volved.133 
A final 1970s case addressing Section 102(1) involved the Department of the 
Interior’s implementation of the Mineral Leasing Act.134 The petitioners had argued 
that NEPA required the Bureau of Land Management to interpret the Mineral Leas-
ing Act to give the agency discretion to deny a coal lease application to a permittee 
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that had otherwise met the statutory criterion of discovering “commercial quanti-
ties” of coal.135 The D.C. Circuit held that NEPA did not override the “plain meaning” 
of the Mineral Leasing Act and a consistent history of agency practice.136  
These few cases give some added shape to judicial review of agency imple-
mentation of NEPA and of the interpretation of various statutory mandates in light 
of NEPA’s environmental impact statement requirements. Yet courts have not ap-
proached the more general question of whether and how the language provides 
guidance on judicial statutory interpretation. 
Despite interpretations of NEPA as a statute with procedural, rather than sub-
stantive mandates, the statute provides clear direction to judges in support of an 
environmental canon of construction. Pursuant to the policy given in NEPA, when-
ever possible, statutes must be read in a manner that best promotes environmental 
sustainability and does not compromise the interests of future generations. There 
is no qualifier as to whom Section 102(1) of the statute applies; therefore, NEPA’s 
directive—that regulations, laws, and public laws of the United States be inter-
preted according to the environmental policies listed—should guide judges in their 
work. 
NEPA requires this interpretation to be done “to the fullest extent possi-
ble[,]”137 a phrase consistent with the notion that ambiguous statutes should be 
read in a manner that tends to favor ecological integrity and human health. As Mintz 
points out, there is a well-developed line of jurisprudence on the phrase “to the 
fullest extent possible” that qualifies all of Section 102—both the interpretation and 
administration mandate as well as the environmental impact assessment require-
ment.138 This interpretative principle, limited to the “possible,” does not ask courts 
to alter the plain meaning of statutes, but rather compels the consideration of en-
vironmental policies in weighing competing possible interpretations.139 Again, the 
environmental canon of construction I have proposed does not mandate a substan-
tive measure of environmental quality, but rather requires legal and linguistic clarity 
if a statute or regulation is to be applied in a way that potentially harms environ-
mental interests and the interests of future generations. 
No court has directly applied NEPA’s Section 102(1) to its own process for stat-
utory interpretation in a particular case. However, NEPA’s interpretive mandate is 
a clear congressional expression for an environmental canon of construction. NEPA 
provides significant evidence of the presence of public environmental values con-
sonant with the other values that substantive canons of construction reinforce. The 
value of environmental sustainability for present and future generations supports a 
substantive preference in statutory cases toward an interpretation that best pro-
tects environmental interests. 
The justification for doing so is rooted in principles that are familiar through-
out the U.S. legal system. As shown further in the next section, such a shift in judicial 
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reasoning to accommodate environmental concerns has precedent in other U.S. le-
gal doctrines and in examples of pro-environment statutory construction principles 
in other countries. 
IV. SHIFTS IN LEGAL DOCTRINE TO ENGAGE WITH ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS: 
PRECEDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND ELSEWHERE 
An environmental canon of construction calls for the interpretation of ambig-
uous statutes in a manner that is most likely to afford the greatest protection of 
ecological integrity and human health. Justified by the text of NEPA and on the 
grounds that the judiciary ought to safeguard vulnerable interests, this canon would 
apply to any law with the potential to negatively impact the environment, even 
where the statute at issue does not itself describe a clear environmental purpose.140 
This ecological theory of statutory interpretation marks a shift in legal doc-
trine. Yet this sort of transformation in legal reasoning is not unprecedented; exam-
ples in U.S. law and in comparative law contexts demonstrate how legal paradigms 
have changed to engage with environmental challenges. The line of judicial deci-
sions on standing and access to judicial review for parties representing environmen-
tal interests portrays an analogous process, where environmental consciousness al-
tered legal doctrine in ways that might have previously seemed unlikely. As com-
parative examples, the principle in dubio pro natura—when in doubt, decide in fa-
vor of nature—has reshaped statutory interpretation, and the recognition of an 
ecological function of property has redefined traditional thinking about property 
rights. These experiences provide a pattern to show how an environmental canon 
of construction can be incorporated into U.S. law. 
A. Changing Doctrines of Standing 
Before the modern era of environmental law that began in the mid-twentieth-
century, judicial application of environmental norms was done largely as a matter 
of private law.141 Nuisance law provided judicial redress against substantial and un-
reasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of property, but the ability to 
bring a claim was limited to those neighbors with recognized property interests.142 
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Public nuisance changed this dynamic, providing a vehicle for addressing 
harms to rights “common to the general public.”143 In an increasingly complex and 
industrialized world, this widened the scope of judicial process, affording an oppor-
tunity to deal with environmental harms such as air pollution that affects the public 
in ways not protected by the enforcement of traditional property rights.144 In Geor-
gia v. Tennessee Copper Co., the state of Georgia brought a suit in equity against a 
private entity—in Tennessee—seeking to stop air pollution that was causing dam-
age across state lines in Georgia.145 The Supreme Court noted the novelty of the 
case, observing that the “elements that would be relied upon in a suit between fel-
low-citizens as a ground for equitable relief” were lacking; for example, the state 
did not own title to much of the affected land.146 Justice Holmes, writing for the 
Court, sustained Georgia’s ability to bring the case, in defense of the environmental 
interests of its residents, “in its capacity of quasi-sovereign.”147 
With the spread of environmental calamities and the enactment of significant 
new environmental statutes came accompanying questions of standing and justici-
ability. Who would have access to the courts to enforce environmental standards 
and regulations, and who may seek to compel administrative action required by 
law? The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in the 1940s had, by this time, already 
opened up judicial review of administrative actions to a wider range of cases.148 
In Sierra Club v. Morton, the Sierra Club sought the ability to bring a challenge 
against federal agencies regarding permits for a ski resort and recreation area 
planned by Walt Disney Enterprises in the Mineral King Valley of California.149 The 
Supreme Court noted in that case that economic interests had been recognized as 
grounds for standing in the context of administrative agency actions.150 The Court 
dismissed the Sierra Club’s case for lack of standing, holding that the organization 
had failed to demonstrate injury to any of its individual members—a mere interest 
in a problem was not enough for an organization to make its way into the court-
house.151 However, the Court also stated that it did not question that aesthetic and 
environmental concerns—if demonstrated by any of the organization’s individual 
members—could be “sufficient to lay the basis for standing.”152 
The Sierra Club v. Morton Court opened the door widely to consideration of 
environmental interests as a legitimate stake in the outcome of a case, reasoning 
that “the fact that particular environmental interests are shared by the many rather 
than the few does not make them less deserving of legal protection through the 
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judicial process.”153 Justice Douglas’s famous dissent argued for a more complete 
revolution, with legal rights of standing held by natural ecosystems themselves.154 
Nonetheless, the majority’s opinion sowed the seeds for a legal shift in doctrine 
toward standing rooted in non-economic harms, based on greater consciousness of 
the role of “environmental well-being [as an] important ingredient[] of the quality 
of life in our society.”155 
Although the Court later circumscribed standing in environmental cases,156 
the principle of liberal standing for claims related to environmental, aesthetic, and 
public health concerns remained, at least in the views of a majority of Justices.157 In 
Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court also allowed a wider assertion of standing 
for the state of Massachusetts as a sovereign entity with regard to potential harms 
from climate change.158 In Massachusetts, the Court was faced with the scenario of 
the most complex environmental problem—climate change—and applied the doc-
trine at its disposal, if not to compel specific substantive government action, at least 
to prevent inaction.159 
The doctrine of standing, as an example, suggests how judicial reasoning 
about what constitutes a proper, justiciable case, and how judges approach ques-
tions involving environmental matters can change over time. The principle of inter-
pretation called for in NEPA is not a radical departure from this phenomenon. In-
creasingly, we are becoming aware of how much we are a part of, and not separate 
from, the environment around us. As our society gains greater understanding of 
how our economic, social, and cultural foundations are tied to the environment and 
to ecological functions, the role for environmental considerations in judging the im-
plication of statutes becomes easier to see. These principles point to the underlying 
values that support a substantive environmental canon of construction. 
B. Lessons from Comparative Law 
In many parts of the world, environmental issues are at the forefront of legal 
reforms.160 National constitutions, regional agreements, and international negotia-
tions point to the importance of environmental law. The international community, 
in particular, has taken several important steps in the past few years to reshape 
traditional legal doctrines to accommodate environmental interests.161 The UN’s 
Sustainable Development Goals, adopted in 2015 as the successors to the Millen-
nium Development Goals,162 have raised the profile of environmental concerns in 
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international thinking about development and the rule of law. In 2016, the IUCN 
World Declaration on Environmental Rule of Law affirmed that “[s]trenghtening the 
rule of law is critical to protecting environmental, social, and cultural values and to 
achieving ecologically sustainable development[.]”163 The Declaration lays out prin-
ciples for integrating environmental values into the legal system, calling for recog-
nition of both environmental rights and obligations.164 
Although legal traditions in each country differ,165 various nations’ courts have 
put these principles in practice. As illustrated below, the application of the in dubio 
pro natura principle and the doctrine of the ecological function of property rights 
are examples of significant shifts in legal doctrines. These changes are instructive as 
patterns for how U.S. courts can implement an environmental canon of construc-
tion. 
U.S. environmental law developed quickly in the late 1960s and 1970s and has 
served as a model for similar programs in other countries.166 Since that time, most 
countries have taken a more fundamental approach to incorporating environmen-
tal issues into their legal systems by constitutionalizing environmental norms.167 A 
“right to a decent environment” has, on many occasions since 1970, been intro-
duced in Congress as a constitutional amendment, but never successfully proposed 
to the states for ratification.168 However, over the past thirty years, nearly every 
country that has rewritten its constitution has adopted some form of specified right 
to a healthy environment or to environmental protection. The constitutions of 
ninety-two countries worldwide—and several U.S. states—provide for such a 
right.169 
With this backdrop of constitutional environmental rights, courts in several 
countries have developed and applied a pro-nature interpretation of statutes under 
the principle in dubio pro natura (when in doubt, in favor of nature).170 In dubio pro 
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natura is an expansive concept that guides decisionmaking and provides a resolu-
tion for legal uncertainty in matters affecting the environment.171 
One concrete judicial application of in dubio pro natura has been in statutory 
interpretation. Article 395 of Ecuador’s Constitution of 2008, for example, includes 
the following charge: “In case of uncertainty regarding the reach of legal provisions 
on environmental matters, such provisions shall be applied in the sense most favor-
able to the protection of nature.”172 In a legal system that regards the constitution 
as the highest point in the hierarchy of sources of law, such an explicit call for judges 
to interpret environmental laws carries enormous weight. In Brazil,173 Costa Rica,174 
Indonesia,175 and Pakistan,176 courts have employed the principle to construe stat-
utes in favor of interpretations that promote ecological integrity. 
As an additional illustration of shifts in legal doctrines, countries in Latin Amer-
ica, especially Brazil, have demonstrated how environmental values can shape tra-
ditional notions of property law. In many legal systems in the region, property law 
has long been tempered by the doctrine of the social function of property.177 Prop-
erty, though individually owned, must fulfill its social function; the public retains an 
interest in how property is utilized, in order to ensure productivity and counterbal-
ance tendencies toward concentration of land ownership.  In Brazil, courts have ex-
amined the constitutional provisions on environmental rights and on property to 
synthesize an ecological function of property.178 In short, the recognition of envi-
ronmental values redefined legal thinking about the limitations of property rights—
recognizing a public interest in the ecosystem services and ecological attributes of 
private land, with a corresponding obligation for landowners to refrain from activi-
ties that would damage those interests.179 
Four of the countries mentioned above have a constitutionally guaranteed 
right to enjoy a healthy environment.180 In the other, Pakistan, courts have con-
cluded that constitutional rights to life and human dignity include a right to a 
healthy environment.181 Indeed, because the majority of the world’s constitutions 
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have been written in the past thirty years,182 the interpretation of constitutional 
provisions is likely to be much more significant in such countries in driving reforms, 
changes, and new practices in legal systems. The new constitutions are both 
broader in terms of the subject matter that they address and more specific in re-
solving particular issues. The constitutional environmental right in the countries 
cited above makes it easy to trace a line to a substantive canon of statutory inter-
pretation that favors enjoyment of the right (as well as a canon that avoids inter-
pretations inconsistent with that constitutional provision). 
These comparative perspectives shed useful light on how the in dubio pro 
natura principle can be applied—especially in its particular application to methods 
of statutory interpretation. However, these examples do not necessarily mean that 
a constitutionally recognized environmental right is required in order to reach a pro-
nature statutory construction in the context of U.S. law.183 Short of such an express 
right, the common law and constitutional values underpinning the protection of 
vulnerable interests, as well as the mandate in NEPA, justify the use of a pro-envi-
ronment principle to resolve statutory ambiguities. 
V. APPLYING AN ENVIRONMENTAL CANON OF CONSTRUCTION 
Thus far, this article has sought to lay out the justification for an environmen-
tal canon of construction—a rule that judges should interpret statutes, when possi-
ble, in favor of a construction that tends toward ecological integrity, human health, 
and long-term environmental sustainability. Many theories compete to explain (de-
scriptively) and justify (normatively) the range of substantive canons, but one uni-
fying factor across many of these canons is the tendency toward safeguarding vul-
nerable interests. To the extent that this public value—concern for the underrepre-
sented or the powerless—animates substantive canons, the crisis of environmental 
degradation and overexploitation compels us to consider whether environmental 
interests are also deserving of this protection. Environmental crises threaten both 
intragenerational and intergenerational justice. Process-based theory on environ-
mental policymaking, market and government failures in environmental regulation, 
and concern for the interests of future generations all give rise to the need for an 
environmental canon. 
Against this theoretical backdrop, NEPA’s mandate calls on courts to interpret 
the law in accordance with the policy of human coexistence with nature “in produc-
tive harmony” and the fulfillment of “the social, economic, and other requirements 
of present and future generations of Americans.”184 To meet this ideal, what should 
an environmental canon of construction look like in practice? This section considers 
three examples from recent cases to test the contours of the idea. The examples 
are chosen to draw out some of the complications in applying the canon. Statutory 
                                                                
 182. Toronto Initiative for Economic and Social Rights, supra note 169 (database includes analysis 
of 83 constitutions originally adopted in 1984 or earlier, and 112 since then). 
 183. In other words, a constitutional amendment adding environmental rights in the U.S. Consti-
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 184. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2012). 
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interpretation is usually straightforward, but in the small sample of appellate cases, 
it is never so simple. Principles that weigh in favor of one resolution run up against 
competing values. Having an environmental canon of construction puts important 
interests in a place where they may be appropriately considered; even when it does 
not alter the outcome, it enhances the legitimacy of those concerns and, hopefully, 
leads to a better balance. 
A. Lacey Act 
The Lacey Act is an old wildlife law, dating originally to 1900.185 Named after 
its principal sponsor, Congressman John Lacey, the Act first came into being as a 
federal backstop for state wildlife regulation.186 In its original form, the Lacey Act 
prohibited interstate trafficking in wildlife that had been taken in violation of state 
laws, and also disallowed the importation of foreign wild animals or birds without 
a permit.187 The Act has since been revised and expanded several times: it now ad-
dresses foreign commerce in wildlife and birds taken in violation of the laws of the 
country of origin, and, since it was most recently amended in 2008, now prohibits 
the importation or trafficking in plants and plant products in violation of source 
country or state law.188 
A related provision in the Lacey Act provided a process for federal officials 
(originally the Department of Agriculture, but now the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
within the Department of the Interior) to prohibit the importation of wildlife species 
deemed to be “injurious.”189 In 1960, Congress expanded this section, now in Title 
18, to proscribe: 
 
[t]he importation into the United States, any territory of the 
United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico, or any possession of the United States, or any ship-
ment between the continental United States, the District of Co-
lumbia, Hawaii, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any pos-
session of the United States . . . such [animal] species . . . which 
the Secretary of the Interior may prescribe by regulation to be 
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injurious to human beings, to the interests of agriculture, horti-
culture, forestry, or to wildlife or the wildlife resources of the 
United States[.]190 
 
In April 2017, a panel of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals decided a case that 
the U.S. Association of Reptile Keepers had brought against the Department of the 
Interior, in which the court parsed the interpretation of this statutory provision.191 
In 2015, the Fish and Wildlife Service had listed several species of snakes as “injuri-
ous,” to which the import and shipment provisions of the Lacey Act would apply.192 
The government had, for some time, taken the position that the Lacey Act allowed 
it to prohibit all interstate shipments of injurious species.193 The Reptile Keepers 
brought suit, arguing that the language of the statute—“between the continental 
United States, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 
or any possession of the United States”194—meant that state-to-state transporta-
tion within the continental United States was not prohibited, and rather, that the 
statute applied only to shipments between the continental states as a whole and 
the other jurisdictions listed.195 
The D.C. Circuit panel that heard the case ruled in favor of the Reptile Keepers, 
holding that the statute could not be used to prohibit interstate transportation 
within the continental United States.196 Remarkably, the court found the statute to 
be clear and unambiguous, despite the argument that the provision could be read 
multiple ways.197 The court cited style manuals to support a conclusion that “be-
tween,” as used in the statute, meant only relationships “across” the identified 
items in the list, and that it said “nothing about relationships within any one of the 
listed items.”198 Following this justification were a number of examples of phrases 
where “between” is naturally understood in this sense.199 
The court’s finding that the statute was “clear”200 served the purpose of sim-
plifying its reasoning, allowing the court to skirt the applicability of other doctrines 
and rules of interpretation. However, a more skeptical reading of the case shows 
that the court was willing to strain quite hard in order to come up with this result; 
multiple times, the court brushed aside apparent ambiguities and problems in order 
to defend its conclusion that the statute had only one clear and straightforward 
interpretation. 
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The court rejected the federal government’s contention that this reading of 
the statute would lead to absurd inconsistencies.201 For example, under the court’s 
decision, the ban applies to shipments of injurious species from Virginia to Wash-
ington, D.C. (because the District of Columbia is listed separately), but not from Vir-
ginia to Maryland.202 The court reasoned that this was plausible under the theory 
that Congress intended to leave it up to states to choose whether and how to pro-
tect their respective state borders from injurious species already found within the 
United States—and while those states could do so, Congress sought to protect D.C. 
specifically, given that this language was adopted in 1960, prior to the passage of 
the Home Rule Act in 1973.203 Yet the scope of state authority to do this effectively 
was not clear at the time: the D.C. Circuit cited Maine v. Taylor for this proposition, 
which the Supreme Court did not decide until 1986, decades after the amendments 
to the Lacey Act at issue—and in that case, the Court overturned a First Circuit de-
cision that would have struck down a state invasive species statute as a violation of 
the dormant Commerce Clause.204 
Further, even if the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning gave a possible explanation for the 
separate listing of the District of Columbia in the statute, it did not explain the rest 
of the awkward wording, nor did it fully explain the inclusion of Hawaii. As to Ha-
waii, the explanation was that the statute protected the “continental United States” 
from invasive species present in the island state;205 however, if Congress was leav-
ing it up to the states to protect against harm from species already present in the 
country, the prohibition would not need to extend to shipments to Hawaii. In addi-
tion, the court’s cramped reading of “between” only to cover transportation 
“across” the items listed in the provision would not prohibit shipments between 
any two possessions of the United States not specifically listed (such as Guam and 
the Northern Mariana Islands, for example). 
The application of the proposed environmental canon of construction may not 
necessarily have altered the outcome in the Reptile Keepers case. However, it would 
have provided an alternative lens through which the court could view the question 
of what the statute means. In general, substantive canons are thought not to over-
come clear language in the law (although the degree of “clarity” required may de-
pend on the strength of the presumptions associated with the canon).206 It is possi-
ble that considering the environmental canon would prompt further examination 
of whether the language in the Lacey Act was actually clear, or whether the govern-
ment’s position was actually a plausible reading of ambiguous phrasing.207 
With the canon as an influence on the interpretive process, the door would 
then be open for the judges in the case to weigh equitably the concerns expressed 
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by competing principles of law in the case. On the one hand, the environmental 
canon points toward an interpretation of the statute that best protects the environ-
mental interest at stake—the safeguarding of ecological and human health from 
trade in invasive or otherwise harmful species. The canon ought to be stronger in 
this instance, where it lines up with the purpose underlying the broader statute, the 
Lacey Act: shoring up state wildlife laws and regulating “the introduction of Ameri-
can or foreign birds or animals in localities where they have not heretofore ex-
isted.”208 On the other hand is the rule of lenity, which would caution toward nar-
row construction of the prohibited acts.209 Engaging with these competing princi-
ples would lead to a more robust decision—regardless of the ultimate outcome—
that would take into account a wider set of the concerns in fulfilling the intent of 
Congress while respecting the charge to avoid irreparable harm both to individual 
liberties as well as the environment. 
B. Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA: “Any Air Pollutant” 
In 2014, the Supreme Court decided a statutory interpretation case, Utility Air 
Regulatory Group v. EPA, involving provisions of the Clean Air Act—provisions that, 
in the context of regulating greenhouse gases (GHGs), appeared incompatible.210 
Following the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA,211 which held 
that the Clean Air Act’s definition of “air pollutant” could encompass climate-forcing 
GHGs,212 the EPA made a finding that such gases endangered human health and 
welfare, and subsequently undertook to regulate GHG emissions from motor vehi-
cles.213 The Obama Administration’s EPA concluded that its decision to regulate 
GHGs from mobile sources “triggered” an obligation to regulate GHGs from station-
ary sources under two different portions of the Clean Air Act: the Prevention of Sig-
nificant Deterioration (PSD) program in Title I, and Title V permitting.214 Regulation 
would mean that “major” sources would be required to deploy the best available 
control technology (BACT) as determined by EPA.215 
The difficulty was that the BACT requirement applies to “major emitting fa-
cilit[ies],” defined in the statute as those that “emit, or have the potential to emit,” 
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either 100 or 250 tons per year of most air pollutants.216 For conventional pollu-
tants, that limit posed no problem; it served the Act’s purpose of targeting a smaller 
number of large sources of pollution for regulation. However, in the case of GHGs, 
250 tons of carbon dioxide—the most common of the pollutants found to endanger 
human health and welfare via climate change—is an insignificant amount and neg-
ligible in impact for a nationwide regulatory program.217 The EPA argued that regu-
lation of all major sources under this definition would be inappropriate and imprac-
ticable for application because, at that level, the Act’s regulatory net would catch 
thousands upon thousands of sources—including “large office and residential build-
ings, hotels, large retail establishments” and other categories far removed from the 
EPA’s technical and practical ability to regulate.218 As a result, EPA included in its 
rulemaking a plan to “tailor” the regulation to first apply to large emitters of carbon 
dioxide, beginning first with sources that already required permits for conventional 
pollutants, and then to sources with the potential to emit at least 75,000 or 100,000 
tons of CO2 per year.219 
The Court in UARG analyzed whether the EPA had appropriately interpreted 
the Clean Air Act to trigger stationary source regulation. The majority reasoned that, 
although the Act-wide definition of “air pollutant” included GHGs,220 its broad 
catch-all language could not apply in every “operative provision” of the Clean Air 
Act, in which “EPA has routinely given [the term] a narrower, context-appropriate 
meaning.”221 The crux of the statutory interpretation question in the case, then, was 
how to reconcile the command to regulate “any air pollutant” from stationary 
sources—or even any already regulated air pollutant (as EPA had interpreted it)—
with the apparent absurdity of classifying nearly everything as a “major source.” 
The Court purported to apply the standard in Chevron to “empower[] the 
agency to resolve the ambiguity” in the statute, so long as it “has acted reasonably 
and thus has ‘stayed within the bounds of its statutory authority.’”222 The majority, 
however, ultimately refused to defer to the EPA’s resolution of the inconsistency in 
applying the Clean Air Act’s time-worn provisions to a new circumstance (to a new 
pollutant with qualitatively different impacts and with significance on a different 
scale of quantities than pollutants that had hitherto been regulated). The Court 
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elaborated that in determining the meaning of the same phrase as it appears in 
different places in the statute, judges “must do [their] best, bearing in mind the 
‘fundamental canon of construction that the words of a statute must be read in 
their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.’”223 
Applying an environmental canon of construction in this case is perhaps tricky, 
but would help provide guidance to judges in prioritizing the different values that 
could not all simultaneously be met in any reading of the statute. The call to inter-
pret the statute in a way most favorable to the protection of environmental inter-
ests and human health would concur with the EPA’s conclusion that its regulation 
of GHGs under Title II triggered application of pollution controls for stationary 
sources under Title I. However, the canon would run up against the competing 
canon to avoid absurd results—covering all “major sources” of CO2 would have dra-
matically altered the scope of the type of entities the EPA regulates.224 
Reading together the majority and the dissent’s perspective of the case, the 
EPA had two options for reconciling the different provisions of the Clean Air Act 
with the peculiarities of greenhouse gases—giving meaning to the statute’s clear 
provisions while avoiding administrative absurdity and impracticality. It is between 
those two options that the environmental canon of construction would again oper-
ate. 
First (as the EPA had in fact done), the agency could interpret the stationary 
source provisions to require regulation of any air pollutant—including GHGs—reg-
ulated elsewhere in the statute.225 Viewing this as consistent with the primary pur-
pose of the statute, the EPA then bent other provisions, at least temporarily, so as 
to create a practicable regulatory program.226 Alternatively, the EPA could read (as 
the Court did) the details first on what constitutes major sources and conclude that, 
because the numerical thresholds would make GHG regulation unworkable, it must 
instead interpret the stationary source provision to apply only to a smaller subset 
of pollutants—i.e., that “any air pollutant” excludes those that cannot be regulated 
using the defined thresholds for major sources without creating absurd or imprac-
tical results.227 
Justice Breyer, in dissent, cut to the heart of the issue. He wrote that the 
proper interpretation of the statute should “assume[] that Congress was not merely 
trying to arrange words on paper but was seeking to achieve a real-world pur-
pose[.]”228 In that light 
 
“[t]he purpose of the [250 tons per year threshold] was not to 
prevent the regulation of dangerous air pollutants that cannot be 
sensibly regulated at that particular threshold. . . . Rather, the 
purpose was to limit the PSD program’s obligations to larger 
                                                                
 223. Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2441 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)). 
224.  Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2430.  
225. See id.  
226. Id.  
227. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (2012).  
 228. Utl. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2453 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 
2018 AN ECOLOGICAL THEORY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 37 
 
sources while exempting the many small sources whose emis-
sions are low enough that imposing burdensome regulatory re-
quirements on them would be senseless.”229 
 
This led Justice Breyer to conclude that “finding flexibility in ‘any source’ is far 
more sensible than the Court’s route of finding it in ‘any air pollutant.’”230 The en-
vironmental canon of construction would provide an additional pillar for the dissent 
to rely on, tilting the balance in favor of judicial resolution of the conflicting statu-
tory provisions that facilitates environmental protection. The canon in this type of 
case serves as a counterweight to the assertion of a greater judicial role in cases 
with major economic interests at stake.231 
C. Yates v. United States 
Yates v. United States232 also exhibits the potential for complicated tension in 
applying the environmental canon of construction in criminal law. In the case, Yates, 
the captain of a commercial fishing boat, had caught a number of undersized red 
grouper in the Gulf of Mexico.233 In federal waters, the National Marine Fisheries 
Service, through regional fishery management councils, manages fishing seasons 
and quotas, and regulates the minimum size for catching certain fish in order to 
ensure healthy fish stocks.234 Inspectors who searched Yates’ boat at sea found un-
dersized fish, separated them, and after issuing a citation, instructed Yates that the 
fish would be seized upon his return to port.235 However, Yates ordered his crew to 
throw the undersized fish overboard and replace them with slightly longer fish—a 
scheme that the inspectors later uncovered.236 
Yates was convicted of violating a criminal statute that prohibits the destruc-
tion or disposal of property to prevent seizure,237 which was not in dispute on ap-
peal. However, the government also charged him with violating a provision of the 
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act—a law enacted in response to fraud in financial markets—re-
lated to the destruction of objects to impede a federal investigation.238 That statute 
reads: 
 
Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers 
up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or 
tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence 
the investigation or proper administration of any matter within 
the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States 
. . . shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 
years, or both.239 
 
The Supreme Court addressed the statutory interpretation question of 
whether the concept of a “tangible object” in the statute could include the fish 
Yates tossed overboard.240 Although a natural reading of the phrase “tangible ob-
ject” would clearly encompass a fish, a plurality of the Court employed canons of 
construction to limit its application.241 In this context, the four-Justice plurality held 
“tangible object” is limited to “objects one can use to record or preserve infor-
mation, not all objects in the physical world.”242 
The plurality relied principally on two linguistic canons of construction, often 
known by their Latin names, noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis.243 The first, nosci-
tur a sociis, indicates that a word in a list is understood with reference to “the com-
pany it keeps.”244 In other words, the phrase “tangible object” should refer only to 
those involving “records” or “documents.”245 Per the ejusdem generis canon, 
“[w]here general words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the gen-
eral words are [usually] construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those 
objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.”246 According to this rule, the 
general phrase “tangible object” is limited to the category of tangible objects similar 
to records or documents; were it not so, the all-encompassing broad phrase would 
make the specific terms unnecessary.247 
To a certain extent, the disagreement between the five Justices who voted to 
overturn the lower court’s decision and the four dissenters was about whether they 
saw the relevant statutory provision as ambiguous. For the dissent, the words of 
the statute were perhaps harsh, but clear: a fish is a tangible object.248 For the plu-
rality, on the other hand, and for Justice Alito, who wrote a separate concurring 
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opinion, the canons opened up significant ambiguity as to how a faithful agent of 
Congress should read the statute.249 
In what way would a court use a substantive canon of construction in this 
case? The plurality, at the end of the opinion, noted that “if our recourse to tradi-
tional tools of statutory constructions leaves any doubt about the meaning of ‘tan-
gible object,’ . . . we would invoke the rule [of lenity].”250 Justice Ginsburg’s opinion 
nodded to the rule of lenity even though the statute on its face was not ambigu-
ous—there was no linguistic or syntactic question about how to read the phrase at 
issue. Rather, the history of the provision made the Justices question whether the 
statute’s broad language was intended to reach conduct like the defendant’s, and 
the Court bent it toward a more lenient contextual interpretation. 
Notably absent from the three opinions is any discussion of the value served 
by the regulation of the underlying act—the prohibition on catching undersized fish. 
Although the federal criminal code provisions at stake in this case, and their source 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, are not “environmental” laws, the implementation and en-
forcement of these provisions can have a measurable impact on environmental in-
terests. 
In this example, the environmental canon of construction would point toward 
a broad reading of “tangible object.” Criminalization of efforts to obstruct investi-
gations is likely intended both as a deterrent to such obstructions—a way to bolster 
the effectiveness and accuracy of the investigative process—and as a fallback mech-
anism for punishing crimes for which little tangible evidence exists. Enforcement of 
fisheries management rules that promote ocean sustainability becomes more diffi-
cult when someone who destroys evidence of misconduct is, so to speak, let off the 
hook. 
For the four dissenting Justices, the environmental canon would not have an 
effect on the bottom-line outcome: they already saw the statute as clear, and lim-
ited the weight that would be given to contextual and extratextual clues. For the 
other five, the canon would become important, but would also run up against other 
considerations, and most notably, against the rule of lenity. The lenity rationales—
the value of ensuring adequate notice about what conduct is prohibited, and of in-
centivizing legislative clarity—appear to clash in this case with the value of enabling 
effective enforcement for laws that promote long-term sustainability. 
Reliance on the environmental canon of construction may have swung the 
outcome of Yates, but with other canons and rules on the opposite side of the 
ledger, that conclusion is less than certain. However, even if an appeal to the envi-
ronmental canon did not prove outcome-determinative, it would still be an im-
portant tool for placing critical environmental interests in the legal discourse. If a 
judge considers the environmental canon of construction, but ultimately concludes 
that the rule of lenity, backed by linguistic canons, predominates, then that is the 
type of reasoned decision that we should hope and expect judges to make. 
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VI. LOOKING FORWARD 
The proposal for an environmental canon of construction is modest in that it 
does not mandate a change in the way judges approach most cases of statutory 
interpretation. Rather, it calls for an adjustment—a shift in the public values that 
form the basis for substantive canons of construction in light of environmental cri-
ses and general concern for the rights and needs of future generations. 
Support for this adjustment finds root in existing U.S. law, in past practices, in 
comparative legal systems, and in the underlying legal philosophy that supports 
many other canons of construction—as a check on threats to significant, but vul-
nerable interests. It is also important, however, to consider alternative theories and 
note what an environmental canon of construction, as this Article has described it, 
cannot do. 
A. Why the Environmental Canon of Construction? 
This section addresses some potential alternative ideas in the area of statu-
tory interpretation as it affects environmental law. An environmental canon of con-
struction is justified by the reasons articulated above, but its use may require some 
exploration of the limits of the canon as well. Articulating the canon may lead to 
additional questions about how it works and why it is necessary or beneficial for 
understanding and applying the law. 
First, an obvious question raised by the canon is how a judge will know which 
plausible interpretation of a statute is most favorable to the environment. Or, more 
generally, how does a judge know what is best for the environment, or how to make 
tradeoffs among options that may have varying advantages or disadvantages for 
competing environmental interests? For example, a decision that limits human ex-
posure to air pollutants in one area might lead to indirect negative impacts on wild-
life and ecosystems elsewhere. 
While this may be a concern in some cases, in general it does not seem like a 
different judgment in kind than others that judges make; the judiciary is well-
equipped to make tradeoffs, and could do so here. Credible scientific evidence of 
environmental impacts would be useful in the same ways that it is in other cases.251 
More importantly, the canon is applicable in cases where the statute is not clear; it 
seems unlikely, at least in the abstract, that both the statute would be ambiguous 
and that the environmental impacts (presumed to be significant) would also be 
equally ambiguous. To the extent that the environmental interests relevant to the 
case are unclear, that concern would suggest a more limited weight for the inter-
pretative rule in its particular application to that case, rather than an argument 
against the existence of the rule in general. 
Second, one may wonder what happens when environmental interests con-
flict with other public values or with other recognized concerns, such as individual 
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property rights. We expect judges to balance competing rights and interests all the 
time. Indeed, the point of the environmental canon of construction is to ensure that 
there is, in fact, a balance. When a statute is ambiguous, this is not the only canon 
that a court would use, but it should at least be one method for resolving statutory 
interpretation questions. If a court concludes that other interpretative tools weigh 
more strongly in another direction, the environmental canon of construction rightly 
yields. 
Third, how far does the canon reach? When applied to the core set of envi-
ronmental and natural resources laws, the environmental canon of construction 
may be easily aligned with broader statutory context and purpose. To what extent 
is this canon still justified in interpreting other statutes? As Todd Agaard has writ-
ten, environmental law is increasingly “embedded” in larger, non-environmental 
programs, including tax law, transportation legislation, and food/agriculture pol-
icy.252 These programs are, notably, implemented by agencies that do not specialize 
in environmental matters.253 Other laws have experienced “green drift,” incorpo-
rating, to varying degrees, some consideration of environmental principles and val-
ues, whether by legislative amendment or changes in implementation.254 In short, 
Congress has recognized that a wide variety of laws can impact the environment; 
courts should too. The scope of NEPA’s call for interpretation consistent with envi-
ronmental principles is universal—by its terms, it applies to all “policies, regulations, 
and public laws of the United States.”255 
Additional concerns about the applicability of the environmental canon of 
construction may speak more to the strength of the presumption in creates in stat-
utory interpretation, rather than the justification for the principle. Further explora-
tion as to how strong the presumption is, and how it works in practice in tandem 
with other judicial tools for reading statutes, would be welcome. The argument 
made here is that the theoretical and statutory foundation for an environmental 
canon of construction is significant and that it is supported by NEPA, by analogy to 
other substantive canons of construction, by principles applied in comparative law 
that suggest some commonality, and by other experiences with environmental law 
and judicial doctrines.256 
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B. What about Chevron deference? 
One of the most significant challenges in U.S. environmental law is that the 
law is no longer new. Most of the key framework statutes were enacted in the 
1970s, and only one has been substantially amended in the nearly three decades 
since the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.257 The mismatch between aging stat-
utes and our modern, twenty-first century understanding of environmental issues 
makes effective governance a legally complicated matter. 
Some scholars have argued that in the fields of environmental and energy law 
a more robust application of Chevron deference258 is needed, as expert agencies are 
best equipped to handle the task of updating regulatory schemes to meet new en-
vironmental challenges.259 Leaving these types of policy choices to agencies has its 
virtues—including, in theory, more predictable (and more uniform) judicial deci-
sions. However, it also has its well-described disadvantages; Chevron-style flexibility 
means that agency decisions—and consequently, judicially sanctioned interpreta-
tions—may not be consistent over time, as political administrations and priorities 
change. A less sanguine view of agency decision-making, in line with public choice 
criticisms, cautions that agencies with flexibility will be prone to interpretations that 
go against public welfare. In an era of congressional paralysis,260 key policy issues 
are constantly open for reinterpretation, undermining continuity and reliability. 
Judge Calabresi’s call for a “common law of statutes” argues in favor of judicial 
gap-filling as a remedy for the “statutorification” of difficult-to-update law.261 While 
Chevron remains good law, several of the Supreme Court’s decisions in the past 
several years have taken a more assertive approach in defining and interpreting key 
statutory issues, chipping away at Chevron doctrine.262 And notwithstanding the 
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justification that deference constrains judicial discretion, judges can tweak the doc-
trine, at both steps, to meet their ideological predispositions.263 
The point here is not to make a claim as to whether greater deference to agen-
cies leads to better results. Rather, it is to suggest that an environmental canon of 
construction would take on even greater importance to the extent that judicial 
oversight of agency statutory interpretation increases. An environmental canon of 
construction would apply more broadly to statutory interpretation cases than Chev-
ron doctrine, which is limited to review of agency interpretations. However, in Chev-
ron-type cases, the proposed canon would operate in both steps of the process: 
first, as a consideration for judges in evaluating whether a statute is sufficiently am-
biguous to afford any deference in interpretation; and second, to the extent that 
the statute is ambiguous, judges should then evaluate whether an agency has in-
terpreted it in a manner that best protects environmental interests and human 
health. 
In other words, to comply with NEPA Section 102(1), Chevron Step One analy-
sis should consider whether multiple interpretations are acceptable or whether one 
reading should be preferred as consistent with declared environmental policies.264 
If, after this Step One reference to the environmental canon of construction, to-
gether with other textual and contextual interpretative tools, the statute is still am-
biguous, that lens is applied to determine whether an agency’s construction is “per-
missible.” 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Environmental law in the United States became established in a relatively 
short period of time. The wave of new statutes in the 1970s drastically altered the 
case-by-case, liability/compensation-oriented common law system of regulation of 
environmental harms. In an age of legislative inflexibility, both agencies and courts 
have continued to apply those statutes, and conflicts about the interpretation of 
those laws have taken on even greater significance. As Justice Stevens has sug-
gested (in a speech criticizing the holding in Michigan v. EPA, another Clean Air Act 
case, in 2015), statutory interpretation in the United States is often more conse-
quential than constitutional interpretation.265 
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In this context, an ecological theory of statutory interpretation shows why and 
how canons of construction should be extended to protect vulnerable ecological 
and intergenerational interests. The environmental canon of construction derived 
from this theory is consistent with the statutory mandate in NEPA and with under-
lying common law and constitutional values. It offers the potential for substantive 
shifts in judicial reasoning, placing environmental interests on the same level as 
other public values considerations, and confers the process-oriented benefit of in-
centivizing clarity in environmental statutes. It also provides an answer to the issue 
of eroded agency deference in major administrative law cases related to the envi-
ronment. 
In the early days of the modern environmental movement, Aldo Leopold 
wrote of a land ethic: “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, sta-
bility, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.”266 
Leopold saw the land ethic as an extension of ethical principles that guide our in-
teractions with one another in society. Once we see ourselves as existing within a 
broader “biotic community,” and not separate from it, we will include as part of our 
ethical considerations the impact of our actions on the environment.267 
Looking forward, it is not, as Justice Scalia suggested in King v. Burwell, that 
the judiciary favors particular laws;268 rather, it is that the judiciary should favor 
particular interests. As a consequence, in an age when the legislature’s dialogue 
with other branches of government has slowed, and when environmental crises—
and potential impacts for future generations—are becoming more clearly under-
stood, the law is best served when judges are guided toward interpreting statutes 
in a way that furthers those interests. 
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